



# Explosion risk in hydrogen facilities – balancing simplified and comprehensive approaches

Olav Roald Hansen  
35<sup>th</sup> anniversary UKELG meeting Oct 10-12, 2017 Spadeadam

# Hydrogen explosion risk – growing field, but still “behind comma” ...

Oil and gas projects still #1 source of income

Example:

Johan Sverdrup field – LQ, P1, DP, RP and P2 platforms  
(peak production 660 000 bpd)

LR providing safety studies

FEED, Detail Design, As-Built 2014-today




# Experience within hydrogen safety

- 25 years CFD-dispersion/explosion modelling FLACS
  - ❑ 19y CMR/GexCon, 2y GL Noble Denton and 4y LR
  - ❑ 1998=> make FLACS a hydrogen safety software
  - ❑ 1998-2004 R&D test projects – dispersion and explosion
  - ❑ 2001-2008 – Responsible R&D and sale of FLACS CFD
  - ❑ 2004-2010 EU-project HySAFE (25 partners in Europe)
  - ❑ 2004-2012 IEA Expert Groups Hydrogen Safety
  - ❑ Various consulting work hydrogen safety
  - ❑ 15+ scientific articles within hydrogen safety

## UKELG

- 1998 Harwell (FLACS & deluge)
- 2004 Cheshire (FLACS Hydrogen)
- 2007 Kingston (Large scale tests-overview)
- 2013 Cardiff (DDT and detonation modelling)
- 2017 Spadeadam (Hydrogen risk assessments)



# Hydrogen safety projects picking up in Norway?

- 20 hydrogen refuelling stations planned (~5 built)
- Solar H<sub>2</sub> production for truck refuelling
- Hydrogen car ferry by 2021
- Numerous other marine initiatives

Electric & hydrogen: Positive for local pollution and noise

Bergen: ~50% of sold cars EL&plug-in

Region: Majority of 16 car ferry connections to become electric



NY ENERGI: Hydrogen skal lagres på de blå tankene på skissen for fremtidens hurtigbåt. Fylkeskommunen i Sogn og Fjordane vil gjøre fylket til ledende på bruk av hydrogen som energi.

**PÅ HYDROGEN //** Byttes de dieseldrevne hurtigbåtene i Sogn og Fjordane ut med båter drevet på hydrogen, vil det samlede klimautslippet fra kollektivtrafikken i fylket mer enn halveres.

## Sogn og Fjordane går for klimarevolusjon til sjøs

og Flora kommune, og er ledet av Maritim Forening Sogn og Fjordane.  
 - Fylket er at båtene er ferdig bygget og kan tas i bruk rundt 2022, sier Strømme.  
 Han mener at nettopp hurtigbåter er spesielt godt egnet for hydrogenløsning.  
 «Akkurat nå er det en utfordring med å finne en rute på 135 ruter med en betydelig lengre strekning enn det en vanlig fergetrafikker. Skal en slik transporttappe tilhøvet som skal løses»

## Utviklingskontrakt hydrogen-elektrisk ferje

Statens vegvesen

### Tidsplan - fordeling dialog/byggetid

Aktivitet/fase	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Dialogkonferanse (mars 2017)	█				
Kvalifisering (juni - august)	█	█			
Dialog (okt - mars)		█			
Tilbudskonkurranse (mai - august 2018)		█			
Tildeling (kontrakt) (sept 2018)		█			
Realiseringsfase/bygging (des 2018 - sept 2020)			█	█	
Testing fartøy				█	█
Oppstart anbudsperiode 01.01.2021					█
Testing drift utviklingsfartøy					█
Oppstart med H <sub>2</sub> 3. kvartal 2021					█



29.03.2017

# Siting studies facilities

## Inner zone (fatality risk $>1E-5$ ):

Normally within property limits<sup>#</sup>

1<sup>st</sup> party (workers on the site)

<sup>#</sup> Intermittent exposure of 3<sup>rd</sup> party may be allowed

## Middle zone ( $1E-5 >$ fatality risk $> 1E-6$ ):

Public roads, rail, harbour areas etc.

Industrial sites and offices

No hotels or homes (scattered homes may be allowed)



## Outer zone ( $1E-6 >$ fatality risk $> 1E-7$ ):

Homes, shops, guesthouses

## Beyond outer zone (fatality risk $< 1E-7$ ):

Schools, kindergarten, hospitals, care homes

Shopping malls, hotels and arenas







**Vulnerability assumptions also required:  
Pressure (people and buildings), radiation, projectiles**

# Hydrogen risk assessment approaches

Some important aspects with hydrogen:

- 1) Explosion risk very low with < 10-15% H<sub>2</sub> in air  $P \sim Bv^2$
- 2) Buoyancy very high (reactive gas concentrations)
- 3) Jet velocity & mixing high
- 4) Wind mostly irrelevant; no need to assess 12 directions 2F & 5D

=> Simplified assessment useful in many cases



# Hydrogen risk assessment approaches

**Simplified assessment** useful in many cases (LR risk screening sheet developed by Olav RH shown)

Input in orange cells only	Estimated	Input	Unit	Input in orange cells
Segment volume		0,1	m <sup>3</sup>	
Segment pressure		200	bara	
Segment temperature		293	K	
Pipe or vessel diameter		16	mm	Diameter at location of release
Upstream flow restriction/orifice		0	mm	Orifice diameter, not used if zero
Hole size	4,61	3	mm	Hole size, estimate consider pipe & restriction
Discharge coefficient		0,85	(-)	Cd=1.0 to fit NFPA-2, Cd=0.85 recommended
Release rate	176,65	0,00	g/s	Manual input used if greater than zero
Release rate (g/s) at given time (s)	33	20	g/s and s	Input (s) gives estimated release rate
Kompressibility factor Z	1,12	(-)	(-)	Estimated using Boyle-Charles equation
Detection and isolation time		5	s	if no isolation, use big number
Total mass segment	1,50		kg	
Deflagration pressure ignited jet	0,077	0,00	bar	Manual input used if greater than zero
Deflagration volume (Q9)	0,77	0,00	m <sup>3</sup>	Manual input used if greater than zero
Detonation volume (Q8)	15,54	0,00	m <sup>3</sup>	Using segment pressure and temperature above
Vessel burst- volume of vessel		2335	liter	

The xls-sheet is developed for efficient consequence modeling for hydrogen safety studies. The document is preliminary and being developed by Olav Roald Hansen.

CFD-assessment should be performed if:

- \* Congestion/confinement within 10-15% dispersion distance
- \* Indoor with potential for gas build-up or explosion reflections
- \* Vessel burst among objects near vulnerable targets
- \* For exact estimates of explosion loads onto targets

Models:

- Boyle-Charles Compressibility factor
- Release rate - hole size and pipe impact
- Dispersion distances and cloud sizes
- Jet fire lengths and radiation levels
- TNO-Multienergy blast (deflagration&DDT)
- Vessel burst pressure, duration and impulse
- Projectile (loosebrick) evaluation

Dispersion	Safety distances jet releases	Cloud sizes	Q9	Q8				
Free jet	LFL (4%)	8 %	15 %	Flammable cloud	8% cloud	Q9	Q8	
Near ground or vertically	17,72 m	8,86 m	4,43 m	60,11 m <sup>3</sup>	7,51 m <sup>3</sup>	0,77 m <sup>3</sup>	15,54 m <sup>3</sup>	
	22,15 m	11,07 m	5,54 m	84,15 m <sup>3</sup>	10,52 m <sup>3</sup>	1,08 m <sup>3</sup>	21,76 m <sup>3</sup>	
<b>Jet fires</b>	Distance	Radius to contours	Rmax	Chosen radiation level	Visible flame length			
<b>Radiation distances jet fire</b>	max radiation	1,58kW/m <sup>2</sup>	4,73kW/m <sup>2</sup>	25,2 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	12,5 kW/m <sup>2</sup>	Lvis		
Free jet	4,72 m	7,75 m	4,47 m	1,94 m	2,75 m	7,43 m		
Near ground or vertically	5,90 m	10,27 m	5,93 m	2,57 m	3,65 m	9,29 m		
	X(Rmax)	Drad (total safety distance)						
Free jet	12,47 m	9,19 m	6,66 m	7,47 m				
Near ground or vertically	16,17 m	11,83 m	8,47 m	9,55 m				
<b>Vessel burst</b>	Distance to pressure level	Pressure level	Distance	"Loose brick"				
<b>Safety distances and loads</b>	1 barg	0.2 barg	0.05 barg	0.065 barg	2 m	length	0,2 m	
Distance	9,86 m	24,59 m	56,89 m	46,89 m	Pressure	18,709 barg	density	2000 kg/m <sup>3</sup>
Pressure impulse	249,2 Pa s	110,9 Pa s	51,89 Pa s	59,2 Pa s	860,9 Pa s	area	0,015 m <sup>2</sup>	
Pressure duration	5,35 ms	11,91 ms	21,41 ms	18,40 ms	1,01 ms	side-on impulse	0 Pa s	
<b>Reflected loads</b>	Reflected	projectile	Side-on blast	Reflected				
Reflected pressure	2,00 barg	0,40 barg	0,10 barg	0,13 barg	37,42 Pa s	weight	6 kg	
Reflected impulse	498,5 Pa s	221,8 Pa s	103,8 Pa s	118,4 Pa s	1721,9 Pa s	velocity	2,15 m/s	
Reflected pressure duration	5,35 ms	11,91 ms	21,41 ms	18,40 ms	1,01 ms	energy	0,01 kJ	
						max distance	0,47 m	
<b>Gas explosion pressures</b>	Initial pressure	Distance	5 m	10 m	15 m	20 m	60 m	
Deflagration	0,077 bar	0,038 bar	0,019 bar	0,013 bar	0,010 bar	0,003 bar		
DDT	20 bar	1,422 bar	0,339 bar	0,179 bar	0,113 bar	0,033 bar		









FIGURE E.4. Hydrogen Jet Tank Pressure



# Hydrogen risk assessments – when CFD is required

Concentration > 10-15% AND congestion or confinement (including recirculation potential)

- ⇒ Release and explosion effects
- ⇒ Pre-ignition (jet-) turbulence
- ⇒ Geometry effects at explosion source
- ⇒ Blast waves detailed loading (3D) – durations, reflections & shielding etc.



Most indoor scenarios....

- What detection time can be expected?
- Is emergency ventilation effective?
- What is actual release rate from pipe?
- Is there a potential for DDT, if so...

Vessel burst scenarios near targets





# Liquid hydrogen

H<sub>2</sub> smallest molecule– 0.07 x density of air

- Important safety principle – hydrogen to disappear upwards

Exception: Liquid hydrogen (~20 K)


- Costly to cool (1/3 of combustion energy)
- Vapours denser than air, in particular pressurized releases
- Challenge: O<sub>2</sub> and N<sub>2</sub> “snow” due to condensation/freezing of air
- O<sub>2</sub>-doped air may give strong increase of gas reactivity

Photos from HSL experiments:


Ichard, M., Hansen, O.R., Middha, P. & Willoughby, D. (2012). CFD computations of liquid hydrogen releases. *International Journal of Hydrogen Energy*, 37: 17380-17389




Storage/handling efficiency may require LH<sub>2</sub>






# Pre-ignition turbulence & DDT



HSL ignited jet 350 g/s, ignited at ~0.8s ~ 150 mbar  
~260 g hydrogen released



HySEA container benchmark ~100 mbar  
15%, some congestion, fully open door  
~450 g hydrogen




What if we combine these scenarios?  
=> 260 g catastrophically released inside container



# Jet release into open container-ignited

HSL jet 350 g/s into container, ignited at ~0.8s ~ 150 mbar  
 ~260 g hydrogen released  
 Simulated both as deflagration and DDT/detonation

Inside




6m outside



Run: 400003  
 Var: PMAX\_3D  
 Time: 865.02 ms (29)

Deflagration



Run: 400003  
 Var: FMOLE\_3D, PROD\_3D (volume)  
 Var: PMAX\_3D (surface)  
 Time: 815.02 ms (19)

End of container fully open  
 2-3 bar pressure predicted before  
 pressure is felt at door opening

Questions:

Is scenario credible?

How to take into account in risk & safety study?

What is the beneficial effect of explosion venting?

What about emergency ventilation?

*Release rate ~100 g/s filling container surely is ...*












*CFD modelling*

*Limited for severe cases*

*Ventilation good for moderate release rates*

# Jet release into open container-ignited – video frames

HSL jet 350 g/s into container with fully open endwall, ignition at 0.8s, deflagration simulation



# Tank burst

## Challenge 1:

What is the frequency of catastrophic tank burst?

Type 4 steel tanks

– very well tested and rated, wide safety margins

Frequency = zero... or something else?

## Challenge 2:



Very high pressures with very short duration...

Typical building resistance values 0.10-0.30+ bar

Simple tool and CFD in agreement

What is the hazard to people behind the wall?

- Loose brick assessment...



# What pressures were we exposed to from 15.6m<sup>3</sup> hydrogen detonation demonstration?

## Approach 1: "Vessel burst"

Input:

Adiabatic flame temp: 2254 K


Pressure: 8.2 bara

Volume: 15.6m<sup>3</sup>

Preparation time: 1 minute

Prediction: 20 mbar at 30m

Not really optimal source, explosion dynamics lost



Gas explosion pressures	Initial pressure	Distance	5 m	10 m	15 m	20 m	60 m
Deflagration	0,200 bar		0,200 bar	0,096 bar	0,064 bar	0,048 bar	0,016 bar
DDT	20 bar		1,429 bar	0,340 bar	0,179 bar	0,114 bar	0,033 bar


## Approach 2: TNO-MEM curve 10

Input: cloud volume 15.6m<sup>3</sup>


Pressure: 20 bar (becomes 10 bar i.e. TNO curve 10)

Preparation time: 1 minute

Prediction: 33 mbar at 60m



# Comparison TNO-MEM & “quick CFD” for 2.5m<sup>3</sup> hydrogen detonation?



Approach 2: TNO-MEM curve 10

Input: cloud volume 2.5m<sup>3</sup>

Pressure: 20 bar (becomes 10 bar i.e. TNO curve 10)

Preparation time: 1 minute

Prediction: 17 mbar at 60m

Gas explosion pressures	Initial pressure	Distance	5 m	10 m	15 m	20 m	60 m
Deflagration	0,200 bar		0,104 bar	0,052 bar	0,035 bar	0,026 bar	0,009 bar
DDT	20 bar		0,372 bar	0,129 bar	0,080 bar	0,058 bar	0,017 bar

FLACS

0.40 bar

0.125 bar

0.064 bar

0.038 bar

?

CFD accurate in near-field, too much decay in far field due to coarse grid used (simulation shown was performed quickly night before to predict demonstration)

Approach 3: FLACS (with LR DDT-tweak)

Input: Detailed cloud location size/shape, ignition point, grid, output variables and times

Preparation time: 20 minutes, run time: hours (5 to 20 hours)

Prediction: 20 mbar at 30m (simulation not completed)


Far-field

TNO-MEM screening likely accurate


CFD: powerful when details required

Requires fine grid (time consuming)

=> Detailed load pattern the benefit



Run: 000001  
Var: P MAX  
Time: 79.99 ms (13)



Time= 0.010 (s).

# Conclusions

Numerous hydrogen initiatives emerging in society

Hydrogen has in many ways extreme properties

Safety is a critical aspect, but budgets normally limit depth of risk studies  
=> Balance between quick assessment approaches and CFD when required

Optimal design and safety may require other solutions than for natural gas etc.

- Emergency ventilation?
- Explosion venting?
- Optimal size of compartments
- Liquid hydrogen should be handled with particular care

Optimal safety requires competence and understanding ...





## Olav Roald Hansen

Senior Principal Consultant

T +47 91 17 17 87 E [olav.hansen@lr.org](mailto:olav.hansen@lr.org)

Lloyd's Register  
[www.lr.org](http://www.lr.org)



Working together  
for a safer world