




# Modelling in FLACS

## Activities and prospects

**Trygve Skjold**  
R&D Director

# Outline

- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Activities
- ▶ Prospects
- ▶ Summary
- ▶ Acknowledgements




# Background

- ▶ Gexcon develops the computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code **FLACS**
- ▶ FLACS includes the porosity / distributed porosity (PDR) solver **Flacs** for simulating flow phenomena in complex geometries
- ▶ FLACS is primarily an engineering tool used for **consequence analysis** and **design of risk-reducing measures** in the process industry

# Risk management

General flow diagram for risk analysis, risk assessment and risk management:







ACTIVITIES


# Gexcon R&D

- ▶ GexCon R&D develops the CDF/PDR solver Flacs
- ▶ Currently 13.2 developers: 7 PhDs + 4 colleagues currently pursuing PhDs





# Integrated validation framework




# JIP MEASURE


**Modelling Escalating Accident Scenarios and the Use of Risk-reducing technology for Explosion safety**






# Fundamental aspects of fuel-air explosions






# Propane-air (1 bar, 298 K)



# Experiments at HiT


- ▶ Part of Hy3DRM project
- ▶ The goal is to characterize flow and turbulence in wakes downstream of bluff bodies during explosions
  - High-speed camera + laser sheet
  - Particle image velocimetry (PIV)
- ▶ Limited data available: CMI, Imperial College, Loughborough, etc.
- ▶ Important for validating subgrid models in CFD tools






# Parameter optimization

- ▶ Industry PhD project
- ▶ Established cooperation with optimization group at University of Bergen





# Dust explosion modelling

- ▶ Industry PhD project continuing the work from the DESC project
- ▶ Established cooperation with FSA in Germany and University of Greenwich (Stefan Zigan and Lahiru Lulbadda Waduge)




# Particle-laden flow



# Mist explosion modelling

- ▶ Industry PhD project continuing the work from previous work on transformer explosions etc.
- ▶ Established cooperation with Cardiff University (Prof. Philip J. Bowen)
- ▶ Flame propagation in ethanol mist:





# Hydrogen safety




# Compressor in ISO container





# Inside the container



**HySEA**




[www.hysea.eu](http://www.hysea.eu)



# HySEA

- ▶ Improving **Hydrogen Safety** for **Energy Applications** through pre-normative research on vented deflagrations
- ▶ **Call:** H2020-JTI-FCH-2014-1-FCH-04.3-2014 – “Pre-normative research on vented deflagrations in containers and enclosures for hydrogen energy applications”
- ▶ **Consortium:** Gexcon (Coordinator), University of Warwick, University of Pisa, Fike Europe, Impetus Afea and University of Science and Technology of China (USTC)
- ▶ **Start-up date:** 1 September 2015 (three-year duration)
- ▶ Further & updated information: [www.hysea.eu](http://www.hysea.eu)

# Flacs 3: Initiated work on AMR solver



**Apollo Blast simulator** (courtesy of Arno Klomfass, Fraunhofer EMI)







PROSPECTS

# Beyond explosions

- ▶ CFD tools such as FLACS are routinely used for quantitative risk assessment (QRA).
- ▶ The modelling of complex 3D geometries in typical process facilities represents a **significant investment** for the owners and/or operators of the plants.






**Example: Medium-congested geometry  
with low degree of confinement**

# Risk management

Risk management is *“the business of believing only what you have the right to believe”* DeMarco & Lister (2003): *“Waltzing with Bears”*




# What do we have the right to believe?

- ❑ The Monthly meeting in *London's elite Metaphysical Society* at Grosvenor Hotel, London on 11 April 1876
- ❑ William Kingdon Clifford (1845-1879): «**The Ethics of Belief**»







“It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” W. K. Clifford



# Motivation

- ▶ The purpose of risk assessments include:
    - Systemizing knowledge and uncertainties about phenomena, processes and activities in systems,
    - Describing and discussing the results of the analysis in order to provide a basis for evaluating what is tolerable and acceptable,
    - Comparing and optimizing different design options and risk reducing measures.
  - ▶ There is significant uncertainty associated with most risk assessments – however, this may be of secondary importance as long as the use of procedures and information\* is consistent.
- \* Data, Assumptions, Knowledge, etc.

# Motivation

▶ Numerous factors influence the level of safety an organization can achieve for a given system:

- Safety culture
- Potential for loss
- Maturity of the technology
- Risk perception / awareness
- Safety functions and processes
- Safety training & emergency preparedness
- Relevant standards and legislation
- etc.

## Hierarchy of principles for risk reduction:

- Inherent safety
- Prevention
- Passive mitigation
- Active mitigation
- Procedural safety
- ...

# Motivation

- ▶ Statistical records from accidents and near misses demonstrate that engineered safety and administrative procedures cannot replace risk awareness, competence and a healthy safety culture:
  - Human errors account for about 80 percent of all events – only 20 percent involve equipment failure [DoE].
  - About 70 per cent of the events caused by human error can be traced to latent organizational weaknesses – only 30 percent are due to mistakes by individuals [DoE]

# Motivation


- ▶ Management of the operational risk\* in industrial facilities should take into account:
  - The risk analysis/assessment
  - Previous events and near misses
  - Safety barriers / risk-reducing measures
  - Modifications and the age of the installation
  - Technological developments
  - The likelihood of natural disasters and malicious attacks
  - Safety culture, risk awareness, etc.

\* **Risk management** refers to a coordinated set of activities and methods used to direct an organization and to control the risks that can affect its ability to achieve its objectives.




# What if ...

- ▶ We could extend the use of detailed 3D models to other aspects of risk management than ‘simple’ QRAs?
- ▶ We could create a framework for risk management that facilitates learning in organizations through discussion and practice?
- ▶ We could use virtual site-specific geometry models, continuously updated (“as is”, not “as built”) in the daily operation of process plants?
- ▶ We could define the next paradigm in risk management!



Learning Pyramid



Source: National Training Laboratories, Bethel, Maine

# 3DRM



# 3D Risk Management (3DRM)

- ▶ 3DRM is an integrated risk management framework for a specific facility, characterized by interactive use of a detailed 3D geometry model, a CFD tool, and other models and libraries.
- ▶ Within the 3DRM framework, the quantitative risk assessment (QRA) becomes a (more or less) continuous processes that evolves throughout the lifetime of the facility.
- ▶ Realization of the 3DRM concept entails both development of software products and related consulting services.
- ▶ The 3DRM concept is inspired by Agile principles for software development, which put particular emphasis on people, teams, continuous integration and knowledge sharing in organizations.
- ▶ 3DRM is not an ‘expert system’!





# Typical workflow for QRA part

- ▶ Importing (or manually constructing) the 3D geometry model for the system.
- ▶ Identifying and registering inventory of hazardous materials in the virtual 3D model.
- ▶ Identifying and registering potential release locations in the virtual 3D model – set up links to inventory.
- ▶ Identifying and registering potential ignition sources in the virtual 3D model.
  - Two main categories: Specified location (turbines, flares, etc.) and distributed (hot work, lightning, etc.).
- ▶ Identifying and registering main safety functions in the virtual 3D model (post-processing)
- ▶ Registering personnel densities in virtual 3D model (post-processing – personnel risk).
- ▶ Registering relevant boundary conditions: terrain, wind rose, relevant codes and standards, ...
- ▶ Simulating selected scenarios (automated process):
  - Wind simulations – provides the initial conditions for:
  - Release and dispersion scenarios (flammable/toxic) – provides the initial conditions for:
  - Detector optimization studies based on 3D concentration probability density functions, and
  - Simulation of jet and pool fire scenarios, and
  - Simulation of gas explosion scenarios, and
  - Simulation of escalating accident scenarios.
- ▶ Estimating the effect (harm) to structures (including structural response) and main safety functions.
- ▶ Estimating the effect (harm) on personnel caused by physical parameters (personnel risk).
- ▶ Optimizing detector layout or other prevention and mitigation measures based on harm criteria.
- ▶ Calculating and visualizing risk contours in the virtual 3D model.
- ▶ Analysing results, implementing risk-reducing measures, ALARP, updating calculation, ...

Communication

Can be automated

...

# Towards 3D risk management

- ▶ The 3DRM concept is not limited to QRAs, and operative use of the virtual 3D model may include aspects such as:
  - Visualization of the 3D geometry model, including metadata, in the control room, at training centres, on portable devices, etc.
  - Visualization of scenarios from QRA (training, ...), incidents, etc.
  - Hazardous area classification – visualizing zones and equipment
  - Work permits – highlighting specific areas during maintenance
  - Interactive training/site visits for employees, subcontractors, etc.
  - ISO 9000 compliance – issue tracking, documentation, etc.
  - Gas detector optimization based on QRA – various optimization criteria: detecting leak, minimizing damage, etc.
  - Emergency preparedness and emergency response: GPS tracking in 3D geometry, visualizing sensors and alarms, etc.
  - Etc.

# Pros and cons of 3DRM

## ▶ Advantages:

- Step-wise implementation
- Communication with and/or between stakeholders
- Competence building: CFD vs. Engineering models, ...

## ▶ Limitations:

- Implementation cost
- Not an 'expert system' (probably an advantage ...)
- Full implementation requires dedicated end-user

# Case study


- ▶ ... while we are waiting for the dedicated end-user.
- ▶ Generic filling station: 100 kg day<sup>-1</sup> reference [H2FIRST]
  - Compressor in 20 ft. ISO container compresses hydrogen from tube trailer to high-pressure storage tanks.
- ▶ Simplified fault trees [HyRAM / Sandia reports] and event trees for selected accident scenarios:
  - 168 dispersion simulations
  - 168 jet fire simulations
  - 672 gas explosion simulations

## FLACS simulations:


- 1008 simulations
- 2-3 days on HPC cluster




# Hypothetical filling station



# Example: Jet fire scenario




# Heat radiation contours: $f > 10^{-6} \text{ yr}^{-1}$






# Frequency contours: $Q_{rad} > 5 \text{ kW m}^{-2}$







# Lethality frequency – jet fire



# Frequency contours: $P_{ex} > 0.5$ bar



# Over-pressure contours: $f > 10^{-6} \text{ yr}^{-1}$



# Summary

- ▶ Modelling of explosions occurs at various levels:
  - Detailed numerical simulations aimed at revealing fundamental physical phenomena.
  - Pragmatic CFD modelling, often based on the porosity/distributed resistance (PDR) approach, aimed at providing engineering estimates for industrial design.
  - Simpler engineering models, typically based on empirical correlations.
- ▶ There is increasing focus on model validation:
  - Providers of software products for safety applications need to document validation against relevant large-scale experiments.
  - There is an urgent need for more reliable predictions (indications) of the occurrence of deflagration-to-detonation-transition (DDT) in large-scale complex geometries.
  - Simulation of safety gap scenarios provides an interesting challenge for modellers.
- ▶ The 3DRM concept from Gexcon has several advantages:
  - It combines state-of-the-art CFD/PDR models and simpler engineering models
  - The primary focus is on risk communication in organizations and between stakeholders



# Acknowledgements

- ▶ The Research Council of Norway (RCN) supports the **Hy3DRM project** under the ENERGIX program, and the PhD projects under the Industry PhD funding scheme.



- ▶ Statoil, Total, ExxonMobil, ENGIE (GDF Suez), DNV GL and BP sponsor JIP MEASURE. The experimental campaign is conducted in cooperation with Shell.



- ▶ The European Commission supports the **HySEA project** through the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH 2 JU) under the Horizon 2020 Framework Programme for Research and Innovation.





# Questions?