

DDT in a vapour cloud explosion in unconfined and congested space: large scale test

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1

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REASONING FOR UNDERSTANDING

A very brief summary of Buncefield accident

- 1. Accidental spill of about 300 tons of gasoline at still weather conditions at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal (UK)
- 2. Formation of large flammable cloud followed by a delayed ignition, explosion occurred at 06:01 GMT on Sunday, 11 December 2005
- 3. Very high overpressure damages both near- and far-field
- 4. Glass window damage up to about 5 miles (8 km)
- 5. The British Geological Survey monitored the event: 2.4 on the Richter scale
- 6. No fatalities, 43 reported injuries
- 7. 1.5 billion GBP damage (ref New Scientist 31 March 2012)

REASONING FOR UNDERSTANDING


Car damage after the Buncefield accident







AIChE/CSChE LNG Symposium, August 2009, after James Venart







OUTLINE

Presentation outline

- 1. Can detonations occur in accidents or these are too difficult to initiate?
- 2. This is a high level presentation of some recent flame acceleration, large scale experimental tests:
 - a) Harries R J, Wickens M J, (1989), The institute of gas engineers
 - **b)** Buncefiled JIP (2011) Flame acceleration in pine trees (propane/air)
 - c) Buncefiled JIP (2012) DDT in deciduous trees (propane/air)
 - d) Shell flame acceleration tests (2012) in unconfined but congested space (ethane/air)
- 3. Jaipur accident (Hazards XXIII (2012), by Mike Johnson)
- 4. Retrospection: e.g. Ufa accident

HARRIES, WICKENS EXPERIMENTAL WORK

Harries R J, Wickens M J, (1989), "Understanding vapour cloud explosions – an experimental study", The institute of gas engineers

- 1. Ignition by weak ignition source or vented explosion
- 2. Repeated obstacles in 45 m long rig
- 3. Deflagration to detonation transition did occur for cyclohexane/air and propane/air mixture

PART OF THE JIP BUNCEFIELD RESULTS

Buncefiled JIP (2011) Flame acceleration in pine trees (propane/air), (ref New Scientist 31 March 2012, and http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/nstv/2012/04/explosion-simulates-mysterious-buncefield-blast.html)

- 1. Ignition by weak ignition source of propane/air mixture
- 2. Flame accelerated initially but after attaining certain velocity its speed leveled off, no DDT





Video 1

PART OF THE JIP BUNCEFIELD

Buncefieled JIP (2011) DDT in deciduous trees (propane/air), (ref New Scientist 31 March 2012, and

http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/nstv/2012/04/explosion-simulates-mysterious-buncefield-blast.html)

- 1. Ignition by weak ignition source of propane/air mixture
- 2. Flame accelerated and deflagration to detonation transition occurred








Video 2


Shell flame acceleration tests (2012) in unconfined but congested space (ethane/air)

- 1. Ignition by weak ignition source
- 2. Polyethylene tent of $20 \times 6 \times 3$ m filled by flammable ethane/air mixture
- 3. Congested rig of $5.2 \times 5.2 \times 2.6$ m, inside the tent with edge ignition
- 4. Instrumentation: Pressure sensors, Ionization probes, fast framing cameras




SHELL FLAME ACCELERATION TESTS (2/3)





Video 3

SHELL FLAME ACCELERATION TESTS (3/3)



Distance from Spark in X Direction (m)

Jaipur accident (Mike Johnson, "VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION AT THE IOC TERMINAL IN JAIPUR" Hazards XXIII, UK, p 556 (2012)

- Accidental spill of about 1000 tons of gasoline in calm, low wind speed, conditions at the on the Indian Oil Corporation's (IOC) Petroleum Oil Lubricants Terminal at Jaipur (India)
- 2. Spill occurred at approximately 6:10pm on 29th October 2009 leading to formation of large flammable cloud followed by a delayed ignition 75 minutes later
- 3. Very high similarities to Buncefield accident with respect to damage
- 4. It was concluded that the damaging overpressure was generated by detonation

For instance: Ufa accident (3 June 1989) ref. e.g. G. M. MAKHVILADZE and S. E. YAKUSH, Proceedings of Combustion Institute, Volume 29, 2002/pp. 195–210

- 1. Release of hydrocarbons from a large transmission pipeline near Ufa
- 2. Release over several hours leading to formation of a very large flammable cloud in a forest
- 3. Delayed ignition by two trains traveling in opposing direction (additional turbulence mechanism) leading to the accident
- 4. Many fatalities and injured
- 5. Windows were broken 15 km away from the accident site

RETROSPECTION (2/2)





What might be concluded in the light of the current experimental evidence with respect to the overpressure generation mechanism ?



Thank you for attention Questions are welcome

